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Abstract
In this paper, we present a model to support decision-makers about where to locate
safety barriers and mitigate the consequences of an accident triggering cascade effects.
Based on the features of an industrial area that may be affected by domino acci-
dents, and knowing the characteristics of the safety barriers that can be installed to stall
the fire propagation between installations, the decision model can help practitioners in
their decision-making. The model can be effectively used to decide how to allocate a
limited budget in terms of safety barriers. The goal is to maximize the time-to-failure
of a chemical installation ensuring a worst case scenario approach.
The model is mathematically stated and a flexible and effective solution approach,
based on metaheuristics, is developed and tested on an illustrative case study represent-
ing a tank storage area of a chemical company. We show that a myopic optimization
approach, which does not take into account knock-on effects possibly triggered by an
accident, can lead to a distribution of safety barriers that are not effective in mitigating
the consequences of a domino accident. Moreover, the optimal allocation of safety
barriers, when domino effects are considered, may depend on the so-called cardinality
of the domino effects.
Keywords: Domino effect, Metaheuristic, Risk management, Emergency, Safety
barriers.
1. Introduction
Cascade events or domino effects truly are a timely topic. We live in a time where
there is ever more industrial activity, especially within the chemical and process indus-
try. This translates into a non-stop increase in amounts of hazardous materials being
processed, stored, transported, etc. between chemical industrial parks worldwide. As
a matter of fact, the need for more industrial activity is driven by the observation that
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population figures have been sharply increasing on a global scale since a century. Irre-
spective of the underlying reasons of both facts, taking the combination of both these
facts into consideration, automatically leads to the question about their combined im-
pact on societal risk and safety. In the chemical industry, an important aspect of this
impact can be summarized by the potential of escalation of an industrial accident to a
major disaster, or a so-called domino effect.
Although such events are less known than more “classic” major accidents such as
for example vapour cloud explosions (VCEs), BLEVEs, and the alike, they may have
even more disastrous consequences compared to those classic accidents. They are less
recognized and studied by industry, academia and regulators due to the fact that their
likelihood is even much lower than that of the better known major accident scenarios.
Nonetheless, since they became an issue in the Seveso II Directive in 1996, and also
because domino accidents do happen on a worldwide scale (even if they are extremely
rare), ever more research is carried out by academics and industrials to further advance
our knowledge on these obscure events.
Several lines of research have been initiated with respect to the domino effect topic.
For example, indices have been suggested by [1, 2]. Tugnoli et al. [1] developed an in-
dex to assess the domino potential hazard including the effect of inherent and passive
protection measures. Reniers and Audenaert [2] elaborated an index to rank chemical
installations within any industrial area, and based on a their vulnerability for domino
effects. Nguyen et al. [3] analysed the potential for domino effects produced by pro-
jectiles generated by explosions in industrial facilities. Salzano et al. [4] investigated
domino effects related to home-made explosives. Landucci et al. [5] elaborated a quan-
titative risk assessment where domino effects are taken into account, and where events
are triggered by fire. The model is based on an estimation of vessel time to failure.
Cozzani et al. [6] studied inherent safety approaches providing the possibility to pre-
vent knock-on events. Reniers [7] looked into the problem of cross-plant collaboration
and the lack of sufficient information exchange to optimize protection against domino
effects, employing game-theoretical modelling to do so. Darbra et al. [8] analysed 225
domino incidents during hazmat transportation. Reniers et al. [9] investigated the pos-
sibility of attenuation-based security within chemical industrial areas. Furthermore,
in 2013, Reniers and Cozzani [10] edited a comprehensive volume on the modelling,
prevention and management of domino effects in the process industries, providing the
state-of-the-art at publication date and indicating the leeway for further exploration of
the domino effects research area. As can be seen from this brief overview of important
past research on domino effects, the subject is looked at from a safety as well as from
a security point of view, and research efforts are ever more intensifying.
A lot of research is concerned with design-based safety with respect to domino
effects, and hence, researchers mainly focus on managing domino effects in an inherent
way. This is, of course, the most optimal way to deal with such potentially devastating
events. However, this is not always possible. If installations (for example storage tanks)
are present in a certain industrial setting, it is not easy to just replace them or to make
major design-based (e.g. lay-out) changes. Therefore, it is also very important that
research is aimed at optimizing add-on safety with respect to domino effects. The study
explained and discussed in this paper is aimed at such optimization of safety barriers
within existing industrial settings, and employs operational research techniques and
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-science to do so.
The evolution of domino accidents, triggered by heat radiation, overpressure ef-
fects, or missile projection, depends on the presence (or absence) and the performance
of safety barriers. Safety barriers may have the potential to prevent escalation, for ex-
ample, in case of heat radiation, delaying or avoiding the heat-up of secondary targets.
Thus, safety barriers play a crucial role in domino effect prevention and mitigation
within existing industrial settings. More specifically, add-on safety barriers can in-
deed: (i) restrict the propagation of domino effects; (ii) mitigate the consequences
of domino effect; and (iii) be extremely important in terms of increasing the time to
failure of chemical installations.
At present, in industrial practice, the decision to take certain safety barriers for
dealing with major accident scenarios does not take domino effects of a higher order
into account. At most, possible direct escalation of major accident scenarios is con-
sidered (thus only possible domino events with cardinality 0, see Section 2). However,
this is a myopic way of tackling domino effects within chemical parks. Especially with
respect to security issues, this myopic approach may prove to be largely insufficient.
Therefore, to optimize current practice, there is need for studying in what way higher
order domino events can be taken into account in the decision-making process of in-
vesting in add-on safety barriers for existing industrial areas. Possibly, considering
higher-order domino events in the safety barrier investment problem will lead to alter-
native decisions. Hence, an approach and a computer program to determine the most
optimal safety barrier investment decision for dealing with domino effects in existing
industrial settings, and thereby considering higher-order domino events, is currently
non-existent in academic literature and lacking in industrial practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the decisional
model and it mathematical representation is presented. In Section 3 an effective solu-
tion algorithm based on a metaheuristic approach is developed. This solution method
is tuned and tested on a realistic study case in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper
and presents some suggestions for future research.
2. Problem description
In this section, the problem is described and mathematically stated. The main ob-
jective of the model is to support decision makers to optimally locate protective barriers
within an industrial setting of chemical installations, to mitigate domino effects. Given
a budget constraint, the optimal mix of protective barriers needs to be selected in order
to delay the propagation of a major fire resulting from accident towards a chemical
installation that might further trigger the failure of other chemical installations engen-
dering thus escalation effects.
Depending on the intensity of the domino effects, the cardinality D can be used
to denote how many domino events happen after the initiating failure/accident. We
suppose that the initiating event always happens at a root installation and from it fire
might propagate to neighbouring installations engendering thus a cascade effect.
In particular, domino events characterized with cardinality 0 represent the first cas-
cade effect as a consequence e.g. of an accident to a chemical installation (the so-called
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“primary domino events”), whereas cardinality 1 refers to secondary domino events,
cardinality 2 to tertiary domino events and so on [11]. It is worth noticing that when
cardinality is equal to zero the first domino effect is produced. Using this taxonomy, it
is possible to classify domino effects triggered by installation i and affecting:
(i) Situation I: a single neighbour installation j by means of fire propagating from i
to j (in case D = 0);
(ii) Situation II: a neighbour installation j and an installation l, that is a neighbour
of j, by means of fire propagating from i to j and subsequently from j to l (in
case D = 1) and so on.
In Figure 1 both situations are shown. In the remainder of the paper, for the sake of
clarity of exposition when we represent the initiating event resulting in the first domino
event of cardinality 0 affecting the root node i, we implicitly assume that a major
accident (e.g. a major fire) has already affected installation i.
(a) Situation I (b) Situation II
Figure 1: Situation I and Situation II in terms of cardinality
In this paper, an industrial area that is potentially subjected to domino effects, such
as a chemical plant, is modelled by using a graph, G = {N ,A}. N is the set of nodes
representing the critical installation within the industrial area that, after an accident,
may engender domino effects. A denotes the set of arcs (i, j) representing a fire prop-
agation from node i to node j. As a consequence of a failure/accident happening to
node i ∈ N fire propagates, along arc (i.j) ∈ A, in a non negative propagation time
ptij , triggering a failure/accident of a neighbouring node j ∈ N .
A set,Mij , is defined for each arc (i, j) and comprises all the protective measures
that are available for this arc. Each protective measure k for arc (i, j) presents a cost ckij
and a value of effectiveness ekij in delaying the escalation and thus increasing the prop-
agation time needed by fire to affect a neighbour facility j starting from node i. Both
cost and effectiveness associated to each protective measure are based on information,
such as number and type of protective barriers, thickness, equipments and used mate-
rials. These values are assumed to be predefined by a security risk assessment, carried
out by the security management team.
Let B represent the maximum available budget to be invested in protective mea-
sures. For the sake of simplicity, for each arc (i, j), a dummy protective measure,
having a cost c0ij = 0 and an effectiveness e
0
ij = 0, is defined. It represents a default
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Table 1: Set of protective measuresMij for arc (i, j)
Measure
id
Combination of
protective barriers
Cost Effectiveness
0 - 0 0.0
1 A 100 0.5
2 B 150 0.45
3 C 200 0.4
4 A&B 250 0.32
5 B&C 300 0.25
state that indicates that no protective measure is applied on arc (i, j). Moreover, only
one protective measure per arc can be applied. A protective measure can be a combi-
nation of single protective barriers presenting different capabilities, to stop or delay the
fire propagation, depending on the characteristics of the barriers themselves. A com-
bination of protective barriers can have a different effectiveness (greater or lower) than
the sum of the impact of the individual protective barrier due to possible interaction
effects. In some cases, specific combinations of single barriers might not be available
due to possible incompatibility factors (see e.g., Table 1).
In order to make the notation used inside the mathematical model more readable,
a set, FDi for each node i ∈ N , is defined. Set FDi = {P1, P2, . . . , Pq} contains a
list of q fire-paths denoting all possible cascading effects of cardinality D that can
be triggered by a failure/accident happened at root node i. The generic fire-path
Pk ∈ PDi is composed by a sequence of D + 1 arcs starting from root node i (e.g.
(i.j), (j, l), (l,m), . . . ) resulting in an escalation (i.e. accident/failure) that affects a
sequence of D + 2 nodes of the graph G (i.e. nodes i and j in case of D = 0).
To mathematically state the problem, three families of decision variables are de-
fined: (1) Let PTij be the propagation time of the fire along arc (i.j) when at least one
protective measure is used; (2) Let ETi be the escalation time after which a domino
effect of cardinality D is initiated as a consequence of a failure/accident happened at
node i; Let xkij be a binary decision variable that is equal to one if protective measure
k for arc (i, j) is selected, zero otherwise. The decision problem is defined as follows:
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lexicographic max f(x) = (f1(x), f2(x)) (1)
f1(x) = min
i∈N
ETi (2)
f2(x) =
∑
(i,j)∈Pi
PTij ∀Pi ∈ FDi ,∀i ∈ N (3)
s.t. ∑
(i,j)∈A
∑
k∈Mij
ckij · xkij ≤ B (4)
PTij =
∑
k∈Mij
ptkij · (1 + ekij) · xkij ∀(i, j) ∈ A (5)∑
k∈Mij
xkij = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ A (6)
ETi ≤
∑
(i,j)∈Pi
PTij ∀Pi ∈ FDi ,∀i ∈ N (7)
xkij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ A,∀k ∈Mij (8)
The objective function f(x) in Eq. (1) is used to evaluate the quality of feasible
solutions. It is divided into two objectives f1(x), f2(x), to be both maximized in a
lexicographic order. f1(x) and f2(x) are ordered by descending importance accord-
ing to the decision maker’s preferences. More specifically, the objective function f(x)
maximize in order: (i) function f1(x) (in Eq (2)) namely the escalation time associ-
ated to the worst case scenario presenting the lowest total escalation time considering a
domino effect of cardinality D in which a sequence of D node accidents in cascade is
triggered by a failure at root node i; (ii) function f2(x) (in Eq (3)) namely the sum of
the propagation time associated to all possible scenarios with an accident in any of the
nodes triggering a domino effect of cardinality D. This objective attempts to increase
the effectiveness of the safety barriers considering not only the worst case scenario, but
taking into account the mitigations of possible accidents affecting the overall industrial
area. The ranking of solutions is based on a multi-objective lexicographic order, i.e. a
solution x is considered better than x′ if and only if, for some i ∈ [1, 2], fi(x) > fi(x′)
and for all j such that j < i, j ≥ 1, fj(x) = fj(x′). In other words, a solution with a
higher value of f1(x) is always preferred. In case of solutions with an equal value of
f1(x), the one with the highest value of f2(x) is to be selected. Constraint (4) guar-
antees that the total cost associated to the selected protective barriers does not exceed
a predefined budget B. Constraint (5) is used to define the propagation time PTij as-
sociated to arc (i, j) depending on the type of protective measures being installed on
that arc. Constraint (6) forces the decision process to select at maximum one protective
measure to increase the propagation time associated to arc (i, j). It should be noted
that x0ij = 1 means that for arc (i, j) no protective system of barriers has been applied.
Constraint (7) is used to compute for each node the minimum escalation time given
an accident that happens in node i and generate a domino effect with a cardinality D.
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Finally, Constraint (8) represents the domain of the decision variable, which ensures
that no partial protective measures are allowed.
3. Solution approach
The problem described in Eq.(1)-(8), belongs to the class of knapsack problems,
also known as resource allocation problems. These well-known combinatorial optimi-
sation problems have been widely studied in the literature (see e.g. [12]). In general,
knapsack problems include a set of items each with a certain benefit and cost. The goal
is to select a subset of these items in order to maximize the benefit within a certain
budget.
As problem instances grow larger, an exact algorithm will require an exponential
amount of time to solve them. Therefore, the optimality is sacrificed for near optimal
solutions, that can be calculated in a very short amount of time. To achieve this goal,
metaheuristics will be used. The solution approach developed in this paper is based on a
tabu search heuristic hybridized with a iterated local search that makes use of a variable
neighbourhood descent heuristic [13]. The overall structure of the metaheuristic is
shown in Algorithm 1.
It is composed of 4 subsequent phases. In phase 1, some preliminary computations
are made in order to speed up the solution process. In particular, given the cardinality
of domino scenarios that need to be considered, the list of paths, trough which the
accident originating in a given node can propagate, is generated. Moreover, for each of
these paths the total escalation time without any protective measures is computed.
In phase 2, an initial solution for the problem is constructed step by step by using a
GRASP heuristic [14]. This methods selects, in a greedy randomized fashion, one pro-
tective measure at each iteration until there is no more budget available. The selected
measure must not be contained in the tabu list TB and there should be enough available
budget to include it in the current solution. The paths are ordered by increasing total
escalation time and then the first α arcs for which no protective measure is applied yet,
are inserted in a restricted list RL. Next, an arc is randomly selected from this list and
a protective measure, not in the tabu list and whose cost is lower than the remaining
budget, is randomly selected and added to the current solution.
Phase 3 improves the current solution by the means of a variable neighbourhood
descent. Three different neighbourhoods are defined as follows: (1) Internal Swap (N1)
replaces a protective measure for a given arc with another one, that is not contained in
the tabu list, for which there is sufficient budget; (2) External Swap (N2) substitutes
a protective measure of one arc with another one, associated to a different arc that is
not yet considered in the current solution. The substitution must be compatible with
the budget constraint and allowed by the tabu list; (3) Double Swap (N3), which is a
variant of the Internal Swap, executes two moves simultaneously. Two arcs are selected
and their protective measures removed from the current solution. The budget made
available is summed with the remaining budget and used to add two new protective
measures to those selected arcs.
A diversification mechanism is implemented in phase 4 to let the metaheuristic es-
cape from local optima and to explore different areas of the search space. If a maximum
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number of iterations without having improved the best known solution is not reached,
a perturbation heuristic is applied, otherwise a new solution is built from scratch by
reapplying the GRASP heuristic, which is described before. The perturbation partially
removes a certain amount of protective measures from the current solution and adds
them in the tabu list. If the remaining budget, after the removal operations, allows
the introduction of new unexplored protective measures, they are added into the new
current solution in a greedy random fashion as done in the GRASP heuristic.
As in the iterated local search framework (see [15]), phases 3 and 4 of the proposed
metaheuristic are repeated until a stopping criterion is met. This criterion needs to
be defined by the user and it is usually expressed either as a maximum number of
repetitions or, alternatively, as a maximum allowed computation time.
Algorithm 1: Metaheuristic structure
Phase 1: Pre-computation;
Define the list of paths of length D, for each node;
Compute the escalation time ET for each path;
Phase 2: Generation of initial solution;
let x be the current solution and f(x) its cost;
let x∗ be the best solution found so far and f(x∗) its cost;
x∗, x← ∅, f(x∗), f(x)←∞;
Initialize the tabu list TB, initially empty;
x← GRASP Heuristic(TB);
Phase 3: Intensification stage;
while (stopping criterion not reached) do
k ← 0;
while (k < 3) do
x′ ← Nk(x);
if ((f1(x) < f1(x′)) || (f1(x) = f1(x′) && f2(x) < f2(x′))) then
x← x′;
else
k ← k + 1;
end
end
if ((f1(x∗) < f1(x)) || (f1(x∗) = f1(x)&& f2(x∗) < f2(x))) then
x∗ ← x,f(x∗)← f(x);
end
update number of iterations without improvement;
Phase 4: Diversification stage;
if (max number of iterations without improvement not reached) then
x← Perturbation(x);
update TB;
else
x← GRASP heuristic(TB);
end
end
return x∗
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4. Computational Experiments
The metaheuristic, described in Section 3, has been coded in C++ language. After
having tuned the solution approach, an illustrative case study has been solved. In Sec-
tion 4.1, the characteristics of the problem instance are described, while Section 4.2
reports the main results of the experimental analysis. A machine with an Intel core
i7-2760QM 2.40GHz processor and 8GB RAM has been used to run the tests.
4.1. Test instance
Both the decision model and its related solution approach are tested on a case study
representing a storage park of a chemical company. We chose this industrial setting
because it is a realistic representation of an actual chemical park concerned with po-
tential cascade effects. Moreover, since we use this case study for illustrative purposes,
to show the reader how our metaheuristic can be applied to the domino effect research
problem, we kept the example as simple as needed.
To be concrete, this case study is an industrial park composed of 11 storage tanks
with different characteristics such as floating roof or not, differing type of material,
differing size and variable chemical substances. For illustrative reasons, we show a
storage park and its schematic representation by using a network provided in Figure 2.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
910
Figure 2: Network scheme overlayed on an image retrieved from Google maps showing a park of chemical
storage tanks. For the sake of clarity bidirectional arcs (i.e. (i, j) and (j, i)) are represented by a segment
between (i, j)
More specifically, a graph G = (N,A) is used to model the storage park where N
is the set of facility nodes (i.e. the storage tanks) and A is the set of arcs representing
possible propagation links in case of accidents to a storage tank. For example, an
accident to node A may trigger an accident to the neighbour facility B by means of the
propagation of fire from A to B along arc (A,B).
The value associated to each arc (i, j) ∈ A represents the time needed by the fire
originated in node i to reach facility j and to determine its failure. The time for the
fire to propagate from an installation to another one has been supposed proportional to
the distance between nodes including also the impact of the average weather condition
such as wind. The failure times associated with the installations in A are summarized
in Table 2. The time to failure associated to a node can be expressed as the minimum
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time for the fire to get uncontrollable within the installation. These times are related
both to the characteristics of the tanks and to real industrial information concerning the
exposure of tanks to atmospheric conditions.
The values displayed in Table 2-3 and used to simulate an illustrative scenario in
case of a domino accident, were validated by the head of the fire fighter department
of a major chemical company. Therefore, the metaheuristic exercise on our illustrative
case study can be considered to be realistic.
Table 2: Time to failure associated to the nodes
Facility Description Time to failure (min)
0-1-3-4 Small tanks without any protection (Diameter625 meter) 20
2-5 Large tanks (Diameter>30 meter) 35
6-7-8-9-10 Small tanks with protection (Diameter625 meter) 25
For each arc we considered a list of protective safety barriers that can be imple-
mented to stall the fire spread. Each barrier is characterised by a capacity to delay the
propagation of fire, as well as a cost, as shown in Table 3. A maximum budget has been
considered in the remainder of the paper equal to 3.5 Million e.
Table 3: List of protective safety barriers
id Barrier Cost Effectiveness
0 No Barrier 0Ke 0%
1 Automatic sprinkler installation with additional foam 350Ke 75%
2 Automatic sprinkler installation without additional foam 250 Ke 65%
3 Deluge system (water spray system opened as signalled by a fire alarm system) 200 Ke 50%
4 Fire-resistant coating 180Ke 45%
5 Concrete wall surrounding tank + sprinkler without additional foam 2.250 Ke 100%
4.2. Results
Based on the realistic test case, discussed before, we tested the metaheuristic de-
scribed in Section 3. The goal is to shown that it is a flexible and effective decision
tool especially when domino effects need to be considered. Some pilot experiments
have been run to tune the metaheuristic. After these preliminary study test, the internal
parameters of the metaheuristic have been set to the values reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Metaheuristic parameters
Parameter Description Value
Repetition Number of times the whole metaheuristic is repeated 50
IterNoImprovement Maximum number of iterations without improvements 10
Alpha Size of the restricted candidate list in the GRASP
heuristic
5
TabuTenure Number of iterations that a barrier is kept in the tabu
list
30
Perturbation Percentage number of barriers to be removed from the
current solution during the perturbation phase
10%
10
The metaheuristic converges towards stable solutions in a relative small number of
iterations. In particular, the time needed to solve the instance, slightly increases with
the cardinality of the domino effects that the user wants to analyse and in the worst
case takes less than 1 second.
We solved the case study, testing different values of cardinality for the domino ef-
fects. As expected, the allocation of the protective safety barriers differs while domino
effects having different cardinality are taken into account. In a myopic optimization
approach, in which there is only one domino event, as shown in Situation I described
in Figure 1(a), (i.e. the case in which the cardinality of the domino effects is set to
0), the goal is to allocate safety barriers to stop the escalation and thus the arise of
secondary (tertiary, . . . ) accidents triggered by a failure of an installation. However, in
reality, domino effects cannot always be prevented from happening. Therefore, a spe-
cific allocation of protective safety barriers may be more suitable to stall the escalation
and mitigate the consequence of cascade effects even further.
In a planning phase, when the design of an industrial area should be defined to cope
with domino effects, several scenarios can be tested by the decision maker. Optimized
allocations of safety barriers for each domino scenario can be evaluated in order to
increase the time needed by the domino accident of a given cardinality to propagate. In
Figure 3 several allocations of the available safety barriers are proposed for different
values of the domino cardinality.
Despite the barrier type 5 is the most effective, it has not been selected in the
solutions provided by the metaheuristic. This result seems counter-intuitive, but one
should analyse this outcome in the light of the implementation cost. As a matter of
fact, barriers of type 5 barrier is the most expensive having a cost close to the maximum
allowed budget. For this reason, its implementation on an arc would allow from the one
hand a large increase in propagation time associated to that arc, but on the other hand,
it could limit the implementation of other barriers to other fire-paths which, in the
meanwhile, as a result of that allocation, might become the most critical scenarios.
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Figure 3: Barriers allocation for different values of D. The tickness of each arc is proportional to the
effectiveness of safety barriers allocated on that arc. For the sake of clarity bidirectional arcs (i.e. (i, j) and
(j, i)) are represented by a segment between (i, j)
To translate Figure 3 into a real industrial practice, the safety barriers which are
now linked to arcs in the figure, need to be related with nodes, or, in other words, with
chemical installations. Indeed, barriers such as sprinkler systems, water deluges, or a
concrete wall surrounding a tank, are applied to installations (i.e., storage tanks in our
example) and not to the pipework connecting the installations. Therefore, we chose
the following approach. We looked at every node i (with i ∈ 0, . . . , 10) and all its
outgoing arcs. We then applied the most effective safety barrier on i considering the
safety barriers of all the outgoing arcs of i. This way, Figure 4 was developed.
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As can be seen in Figure 4, depending on the cardinality, different safety barriers
are chosen for the same installations. Also, depending on the cardinality, a different
total budget is needed: e2,2 million in case ofD = 0; e2,15 million in case ofD = 1;
and e1,9 million in case of D = 2. This results from the fact that one barrier linked to
an installation serves several barriers linked to several arcs.
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Figure 4: Barriers allocation on each installation for different values of D. The symbol above each node
represents the type of barrier allocated on that installation. For the sake of clarity bidirectional arcs (i.e.
(i, j) and (j, i)) are represented by a segment between (i, j)
13
Finally, the solution approach can be also used to retrieve some information con-
cerning the resulting minimum propagation times of different fire-paths which are as-
sociated to all possible accident scenarios. As expected, the values of these times are
directly connected to the characteristics of the installations and the location of the se-
lected safety barriers.
For each each root node where the initiating event is localized, the fire-path of car-
dinality D presenting the minimum escalation time can be retrieved. This information
is crucial for fire brigades, rescue and emergency teams since the time associated to
each worst case fire-path (in term of escalation times) represents the requested maxi-
mum intervention time to stall the fire and avoid the propagation of the domino accident
even further (i.e. domino events > D). An example is reported in Table 5 where for
each installation the fire-path originating in that node with the minimum escalation
time is reported.
Table 5: Escalation Time for all fire-paths in case of different domino effects cardinality
Node D = 0 D = 1 D = 2
Min ET (min) Min ET (min) Min ET (min)
0 28.05 54.45 71.95
1 26.40 43.90 79.20
2 37.70 55.20 81.60
3 17.50 43.90 71.95
4 26.25 52.65 80.70
5 42.90 69.15 95.55
6 18.15 44.40 70.80
7 31.50 49.00 75.40
8 39.00 57.15 83.40
9 41.25 74.40 91.90
10 41.25 74.40 91.90
Depending on this information the fire brigades can arrange specific trainings and
decide, in their turn, where to locate emergency facilities to reduce the intervention
time and increase their effectiveness.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, a model to support decision makers has been presented. The goal is
to increase the total failure time associated to a domino event of a given cardinality
which may be triggered by an accident happening to a chemical installation within a
chemical plant. This is possible by investing a limited budget in safety barriers which
may delay the propagation of the accident within a plant. The problem of selecting and
allocating safety barriers given a limited budget represents a complex combinatorial
optimization problem that can be tackled effectively by using efficient metaheuristic
solution approaches.
An iterative local search is developed to support decision makers to quickly design
and solve possible accident scenarios presenting different values of domino cardinality.
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Depending on the cardinality of the domino event, the optimal allocation of safety
barriers will change, allowing a delay of the failure time associated to the worst-case
domino scenario.
The metaheuristic is applied to a realistic case study that has been designed to
illustrate and prove the effectiveness of the proposed solution approach. The risk that
an accident, which occurs at an installation, can trigger a propagation of that accident
to other installations within the same industrial setting or to neighbouring industrial
settings engendering thus in domino effects, has a significant impact on the optimal
allocation of safety barriers.
We tested our model and its related solution approach to an illustrative case study
of a storage tanks storage. This example is intended to show the effectiveness of the
proposed decision model and the flexibility of our solution approach. The instance has
been designed on the basis of validated and hence realistic data.
The decision model has been proven to be a valuable support tool to allocate protec-
tive safety barriers and mitigate the consequences of an accident engendering domino
effects. Differently from a myopic optimization, where barriers are allocated to simply
prevent domino accidents, the model proposed in this paper can be used to analyse
more realistic scenarios in which domino effects need to be considered since they may
have a significant impact on the allocation of protective safety barriers. The general
optimization approach, proposed in this paper. can guide the decision maker to allo-
cate a limited budget in order to increase the time needed to stop the escalation of an
accident whose domino effects of a certain cardinality may determine the failures of
other installations within the same plant or located in neighbouring plants.
The method thus can provide a valuable contribution in case of emergencies where
rescue teams of fire brigades need to know the maximum intervention time that they
have at their disposal to stop the escalation of the accident. The solution approach,
developed in this paper, not only is able to determine the ideal allocation of safety
barriers to increase the intervention time in case of a domino accident of a given cardi-
nality associated to the worst case scenario, but it can provide useful information of the
maximum intervention times to stop the escalation depending on the installation where
the domino accident has originated.
The results obtained on a study case were quite encouraging both in term of quality
of solutions and in term of flexibility. In fact, the metaheuristic can provide near-
optimal solution in a limited amount of time and a large number of scenarios can be
simulated by varying: (a) the cardinality of the domino accidents; (b) the available
budget; (c) the features of the critical installations; (d) the number and the character-
istics of the available protective barriers. For these reasons we believe that it can be
effectively used as a powerful decision support tool not only by the decision makers
to design an industrial setting considering domino effects, but also by emergency and
rescue teams to evaluate the minimum time to stall the propagation of the accident de-
pending on the features of the setting affected by the accident and the type of accident
itself. In this latter case, the minimum time to intervene in case of major accident can
provide valuable information on how to locate emergency or rescue facilities in order
to minimize their intervention time.
Future works can be aimed at including in the proposed decision model better
and/or additional data concerning probabilities and frequencies of accidents generat-
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ing domino effects. Finally, the metaheuristic decision tool, proposed in this paper,
might be also integrated in a game theory decision model to generate more realistic
scenarios.
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